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INTRODUCTION

A young woman leaves the doctor's office in her car. She has just
learned that she is four weeks pregnant. She has not told anyone else
that she suspected she was pregnant and is uncertain as to whether she
would carry the baby to term. On her way home her car is struck by
another car, driven by a young male with a blood alcohol level of .10,
which is above the legal limit in Texas.' The young woman does not
think she is injured but begins to develop pain in her abdomen. She is
taken by ambulance to the hospital where she suffers from a
miscarriage.
Across town another woman leaves a friend's house at the same
time. Despite the fact that she is eight and a half months pregnant,
she has been drinking alcohol and has a blood alcohol level of .10. On
her way home she veers off the road and strikes a tree. She is also
1. The legal blood alcohol limit in Texas is 0.08. See TEX.
§ 49.01 (Vernon 2003).
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022
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taken, by ambulance, to the hospital where she delivers a stillborn
baby girl.
In both situations the pregnancies were ended by automobile accidents. In both situations the drivers that caused the accidents were
legally intoxicated.' After the passage of the Prenatal Protection Act,
one of the drivers would face criminal charges for the "death" of the
fetus.3 One might assume that the driver responsible for the "death"
of the eight and a half month old fetus would be the one to be criminally charged; however, that assumption would be incorrect. The intoxicated male, in the first situation, may be charged with intoxication
manslaughter, which is a second-degree felony,4 due to the miscarriage of the four-week old fetus. On the other hand, the intoxicated
pregnant woman in the second situation, may only be charged with
driving while intoxicated, a class-B misdemeanor.5
The Texas legislature sought to protect a woman's right to carry her
pregnancy to term and to protect the potential life of an unborn fetus
by its passage of the Prenatal Protection Act. 6 The Prenatal Protection Act expands the definition of an "individual" to include "an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth."7
As a result of this expansion, the law now provides for civil liability
8
and criminal penalties upon the death of an unborn fetus.
In the criminal context, by classifying a fetus as an "individual," a
third-party may be prosecuted for acts that assault a fetus or lead to
the failure of a fetus to be born alive.9 At the same time, any conduct
of the mother is specifically exempted from criminal penalty.' ° Also
exempted from criminal penalty are all lawful medical procedures in
which the death of the fetus is the intended result of the procedure,
and the procedure is performed by a doctor or other licensed health
care professional with the consent of the mother.1
While supporters argue that the law seeks to protect the rights of
parents who wish to carry their pregnancies to full term,1 2 the lan2. Id.
3. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08 (Vernon 2003).
4. Id.
5. Intoxication manslaughter does not apply to conduct committed by the
mother. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.12 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 49.04 (Vernon 2003).
6. HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th Leg.,
R.S. (2003) (available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/ hrofr.htm).
7. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(26) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
8. See id. cf. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001 (Vernon Supp.
2004-2005).
9. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.01-19.05, 22.01-22.011, 22.02, 22.05, 49.07,
49.08 (Vernon 2003 & Supp 2004-2005).
10. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005); see also TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.102 (Vernon 2002).
11. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.06, 22.12, 49.12 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
12. See HousE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th
Leg., R.S. (2003) (available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/hrofr.htm).
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guage of the statute creates direct conflicts between the mother and
the fetus.1 3 When a prosecutor seeks to enforce the rights of the fetus,

the woman's right to keep her pregnancy private is destroyed.' 4
Moreover, the fetus receives protection from the violent acts of third
parties, but the mother is not held accountable for her own conduct
that causes the failure of the fetus to be born alive. 5
A fetus should not be labeled an "individual" if it is only going to
receive some of the protection from third parties to which an individual is entitled. Instead, this Comment urges the Texas Legislature to
repeal the criminal penalties portion of the Prenatal Protection Act
and replace it with a criminal statute that protects a woman's right to
carry her pregnancy to term and provides enhancements for injuries to
a pregnant woman or alternatively, a criminal statute that protects the
potential life of the unborn fetus as an "individual" and does not provide exceptions for the mother's conduct when she commits an assaultive or intoxicated crime upon the fetus.
Even though the Texas Legislature may have thought it was acting
with good intentions, the criminal penalties portion of the Prenatal
Protection Act only creates further conflicts between the rights of a
pregnant woman and those of her unborn child. Part II of this Comment describes the evolution of maternal and fetal rights by exploring
their development in American Jurisprudence and by discussing certain conflicts of rights that have already occurred between a woman
and her fetus. Part III describes the passage of the Prenatal Protection Act in the Texas Legislature, while Part IV introduces the conflicts of rights created by its passage. Finally, Part V recommends that
the Texas Legislature repeal the criminal penalties portion of the Prenatal Protection Act and replace it with a criminal statute that provides for an enhancement for injuries to a pregnant woman or at least
with a statute that eliminates the exceptions for a mother's conduct
when her actions would constitute an assaultive or intoxicated offense
if committed by a third party.
II. EVOLUTION OF MATERNAL AND FETAL RIGHTS
In order to completely discuss the evolution and development of
maternal and fetal rights in Texas, there are two aspects of this evolution which must be considered. First, one must consider the develop13. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.01-19.05, 22.01-22.011, 22.02, 22.05,

49.07, 49.08 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004-2005) (providing criminal penalties for acts
committed against an unborn fetus), with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.06, 22.12,

49.12 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (allowing exceptions for acts committed against an
unborn fetus when the act is committed by the mother).
14. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (explaining that the right of personal privacy encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (noting that a
woman's decision to conceive or to bear a child is a component of her liberty).
15. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.06, 22.12, 49.12 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
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ment of these rights in the federal and state courts. This aspect

involves a discussion of a woman's reproductive rights, the idea of fetal "personhood" involved in the abortion context, and a review of the
interpretations and determinations that the Texas courts have made
concerning a fetus, in terms of civil liability and criminal penalties for
prenatal injuries. Second, one must consider some of the direct conflicts between a woman and a fetus that have taken place in the past
and may still occur in the present. This aspect involves analysis of
both the practices employed during slavery, which placed the rights of

a woman in direct conflict with her unborn child and the governmental actions taken to prosecute a woman rather than rehabilitate her in
cases of maternal drug addiction.
A.

What is a "Person?"

While every person has his or her own concepts about the meaning
of life and the meaning of existence, legislatures and courts have made
more precise determinations of a "person" in certain situations.16 The

Supreme Court has defined personhood very narrowly in order to determine who is entitled to protection under the United States Consti-

tution. 1 7 On the other hand, some state legislatures and state courts
have given more precise and narrowly tailored definitions of a "person" in order to afford certain rights and protections under state law,
such as inheritance rights and representation by attorneys ad litem,

but they are generally contingent upon live birth. 8

1. Defining Abortion Rights in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade

9

answered the con-

troversial question of whether a fetus was a constitutional person. 0

Since that decision, the question of personhood and the issue of abor16. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.1 (West Supp. 2004) (deeming an unborn child
as an existing person so far as is necessary for the child's interests in the event of its
subsequent birth).
17. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (stating "that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn").
18. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 34A (Vernon 2003) (providing for appointment of an attorney ad litem to represent an unborn child in a probate proceeding);
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 67 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (providing for inheritance
benefits for pretermitted children); ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.665 (Michie 2002) (allowing agreements involving trusts, inalienable interests, or interests of third persons

to include the unborn);

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 45a-132 (West 2004) (providing for

the appointment of a guardian ad litem for minors and incompetent, undetermined
and unborn persons).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. Id. at 158 (stating "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not include the unborn"); see also Ronald Dworkin, The Concept of Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 397
(1992) (discussing opposing views in the abortion debate).
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tion have become highly politicized,2 1 as most Americans consider
abortion
an issue of whether a fetus is a person that has a right to
22
life.

In Roe, the Court held that a Texas statute making it a crime to
procure an abortion was unconstitutional and that the abortion was a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. 23 In reaching this decision, the Court discussed the use of the word "person" in
the Constitution and noted that in no instance of its usage was there
any assurance that it was to apply prenatally.24 Therefore, the Court
concluded that a fetus was not included under the label of "person" in
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment.25
While Texas argued that life begins at conception, and, therefore,
the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from both
before and after conception, the Court responded:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of2man's
knowledge, is not in a
6
position to speculate as to the answer.
The Court noted that in areas other than abortion, theories that life
begins before live birth or theories that provide for legal rights to the
unborn exist only in narrowly tailored situations unless the rights are
contingent upon live birth. 27 In view of those theories, the Court determined that "by adopting one theory of life, Texas may [not] override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. ' 2 The Court
stressed that the State has separate and distinct interests in "preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman" and "in protecting the potentiality of human life."' 29 Therefore, the Court held that
the State may not regulate abortion in the first trimester. 30 During the
second trimester, the State may only regulate to the extent that the
21. "Some 84% of state Democratic platforms support abortion..., while 88% of
state Republican platforms oppose it ..
" Abortion in America: The War that Never
Ends, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 18th-24th, 2003, at 24, 25.
22. See Dworkin, supra note 20, at 397 (discussing opposing views in the abortion
debate).

23. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
24. Id. at 157 (discussing the three references to "person" in the Constitution).
25. Id. at 158 (noting that based on the lack of a precise definition in the Constitution and prevailing legal abortion practices in the 19th century, "'person,' as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn").
26. Id. at 159.
27. Id. at 161-62 (noting that some states permit parents of a stillborn child to
maintain an action for wrongful death, some recognize unborn children for inheritance purposes, and some allow unborn children to be represented by guardians ad
litem).
28. Id. at 162.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 164.
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regulation reasonably preserves and protects the health of the
mother. 3 ' At the point in which the third trimester begins, when the
State's interest is "compelling" and the fetus has the capability of living outside the womb, the State may prohibit abortion
except when it
32
is necessary to save the life or health of the mother.
The Court readdressed its decision in Roe in 1992 when it decided
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.33 While deciding to eliminate the trimester approach, the Court applied stare decisis3 4 and reaffirmed
Roe's essential holding.3 5 Rather than continuing the trimester approach, the Court concluded that the line should be drawn at viability
because "it is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the
object of36 state protection that now overrides the rights of the
woman."
While recognizing that the intimate and personal choices involved
in the abortion decision are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court again addressed the issue of personhood stating, "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
37
State.
Roe's central holding has remained intact for over thirty years despite the attempts of anti-abortion legislators to whittle away at abortion rights.38 While the Supreme Court has avoided determining
precisely when life begins, it has clearly decided that in constitutional
terms, life begins after birth.3 9
2.

Defining the "Individual" in Texas

In terms of civil liability and criminal penalties, the State has fairly
broad discretion in defining an "individual" as long as its definition
31. Id.
32. Id. at 164-65.
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. Stare decisis is the doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a
court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
35. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
36. Id. at 870.
37. Id. at 851.
38. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976) ("[I]t is not the
proper function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, which essentially is a
medical concept, at a specific point in the gestation period."); see also Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000) (striking down Nebraska's partial-birth abortion
statute because of ambiguity and failure to provide a health exception for the life of
the mother).
39. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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does not violate the United States Constitution. 40 A state legislature
may use the term "individual" or "person" for certain statutory purposes, and, based on the intent of the legislature, the state courts may
then interpret state statutes.4 '
The Texas Supreme Court, through its reading of statutes allowing
for civil recovery, has only recognized a cause of action for prenatal
injuries to an unborn child if the child is subsequently born alive.42
The Court, in reading the legislative history of the wrongful death
'indistatute, has held that "the legislature did not intend the words 43
vidual' or 'person' to be construed to include an unborn fetus.
Even though a fetus may be considered to exist separately from its
mother in some situations, the rights which flow from the fetus's separate existence have remained contingent on live birth.44 The Texas
Supreme Court specifically stated, "In view of the common-law rule
that the rights of a fetus were contingent upon live birth, we feel that
had there been the legislative intention to create a wrongful death
an unborn fetus, the legislature would have specifically so
action for
45
stated.

Until the Prenatal Protection Act became effective on September 1,
2003, no criminal penalties existed for the death of a fetus. 46 An "individual" was defined as "a human being who has been born and is
alive."' 47 However, the Texas courts of appeals have previously addressed questions concerning the legal status of a fetus in the criminal
law context. 48 For example, the courts of appeals have answered
40. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506 (1989) (allowing state
preamble be interpreted to provide unborn children with the same rights enjoyed by
other persons, subject to the Federal Constitution and the Supreme Court's
precedents).
41. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.1 (West Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE § 32-102
(Michie 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-15 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-1-2
(Michie 1999).
42. See Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971) (per curium).
43. Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1987).
44. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 2002) (providing for termination of the parent-child relationship when the child is born addicted to alcohol or a
controlled substance); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 34A (Vernon 2003) (providing for
the appointment of an attorney ad litem to represent an unborn in a probate
proceeding).
45. Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 505.
46. Compare Act of June 19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3586, 3589, with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (Vernon 2003).
47. Act of June 19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
3586, 3589 (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (Vernon Supp.
2004-2005)).
48. See, e.g., Cuellar v. State, 957 S.W.2d 134, 140 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1997, pet. ref'd) (holding that Defendant could be prosecuted for intoxication manslaughter when a fetus was injured in utero and subsequently died after birth); Collins
v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893, 897-98 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1994, no pet.) (overturning a
conviction for injury to a child finding that the defendant did not have adequate notice that voluntarily smoking crack cocaine while pregnant could subject her to prosecution after her child was born showing signs of cocaine withdrawal); Jackson v. State,
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whether a defendant may assert as a personal defense, the defense of
the fetus.4 9 They have also addressed possession of narcotics charges
brought against a mother when residual drugs were found in the body

of her infant." Further, the courts of appeals have decided whether a
mother may be charged with injury to a child based on her actions

while pregnant 51 and whether a defendant may be prosecuted for an
offense when his conduct takes place while the fetus is in utero and

ultimately results in the death of a subsequently born infant.52

In Erlandson v. State,53 the 14th Court of Appeals in Houston ad-

dressed the attempts of four male defendants to assert the defense of
a fetus as a personal defense in regard to actions taken against an

abortion clinic. 54 The defendants entered a women's clinic in an attempt to stop abortion procedures.
At trial, the defendants argued
defenses of necessity, defense of third persons, and protection of life

or health, in reference to the fetuses to be aborted but were convicted
of criminal trespass.5 6 The court of appeals refused their defenses because the clinic was a facility licensed to perform abortions and "per-

sonal beliefs will not constitutionally suffice to outweigh the present

status of the law."'57 Similarly, in Reed v. State,5 8 three male defend-

ants attempted to obstruct a passageway leading to an unlicensed
abortion clinic and also argued defenses of necessity and defense of a
833 S.W.2d 220, 226 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd) (determining
that the presence of residual drugs in the body of a stillborn fetus does not satisfy the
element of possession in the possession of a controlled substance statutes); Reed v.
State, 794 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd) (refusing to allow Defendants' argument of defense of third persons when Defendants obstructed a passageway to an unlicensed abortion clinic); Erlandson v. State, 763
S.W.2d 845, 852 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) (refusing to allow
Defendants' argument of defense of third persons when Defendants entered a women's clinic to stop abortion procedures).
49. See Erlandson, 763 S.W.2d at 852 (refusing to allow Defendants' argument of
defense of third persons when Defendants entered a woman's clinic to stop abortion
procedures); see also Reed, 794 S.W.2d at 810 (refusing to allow Defendants' argument of defense of third persons when they obstructed a passageway to an unlicensed
abortion clinic).
50. See Jackson, 833 S.W.2d at 226 (determining that the presence of residual
drugs in the body of a stillborn fetus does not satisfy the element of possession, in the
possession of a controlled substance statutes).
51. See Collins, 890 S.W.2d at 895 (overturning a conviction for injury to a child
finding that the defendant did not have adequate notice that voluntarily smoking
crack cocaine while pregnant could subject her to prosecution after her child was born
showing signs of cocaine withdrawal).
52. See Cuellar, 957 S.W.2d at 136-41 (holding that Defendant could be prosecuted for intoxication manslaughter when a fetus was injured in uterd and subsequently died after birth).
53. 763 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).
54. Id. at 852.
55. Id. at 848-49.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 852.
58. 794 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd).
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third person. 59 The court of appeals explained that an unborn child is
not a "person" for purposes of the defense of defending third persons.6 ° In regard to the defense of necessity, the court further noted
that "what the actor seeks to prevent must first be a legal harm," and
the fact that the clinic was unlicensed does not affect the applicability
of either defending third persons or necessity defenses. 6 '
The 14th Court of Appeals has also addressed questions of drug
possession charges brought against a woman based on the presence of
drugs in the body of a stillborn infant.6" In Jackson v. State,63 the

court determined that "a rational trier of fact could not find either
element of possession of a controlled substance beyond a reasonable
doubt" when Traci Jackson was charged with possession of cocaine
due to the presence of residual drugs in the body of her stillborn fetus.' An autopsy of Jackson's stillborn child found the presence of
.04 milligrams per deciliter of cocaine in the liver and revealed that
the cause of death was probably from ingestion of cocaine. 65 Although Jackson was convicted by the trial court of possession of cocaine, the court of appeals reversed because the results of a drug test
of bodily fluids fails to satisfy the possession element within the meaning of the controlled substance statutes. 66 The court noted that just as
no Texas court has held that a person could be held in possession due
to the presence of residual drugs in his body, neither has any Texas
court held that a mother could be held in possession due to the presence of residual drugs in her infant.67
The El Paso Court of Appeals has determined whether a woman
can be prosecuted under Texas's injury to a child statute for conduct
committed while pregnant that causes injury to her subsequently-born
child in Collins v. State.68 Debra Collins was convicted of injury to a
child by the trial court after her child was born addicted to cocaine.69
The court of appeals reversed her conviction noting that the Penal
Code did not proscribe any conduct with respect to a fetus. 70 Because
the legislature specifically limited the application of Texas's penal laws
to conduct committed against a "human being who has been born and
59. See id. at 807-10.
60. Id. at 810.
61. Id.
62. See Jackson v. State, 833 S.W.2d 220, 226 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, pet. ref'd).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 222.
66. Id. at 223 ("[T]he mere presence of a controlled substance in a person's body
does not constitute possession within the meaning of criminal controlled substance
statutes.").
67. Id.
68. 890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no pet.).
69. Id. at 896.
70. Id. at 897-98.
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is alive" and Collins's drug use was committed against her fetus before
birth, her conduct did not constitute the offense of injury to a child.7 1

Finally, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals addressed whether the
Texas Penal Code authorizes conviction when the victim does not

meet the status of an "individual" but subsequently attains the status

of an "individual" after the alleged misconduct.72 In Cuellar v. State,7 3
the court found that Frank Cuellar was intoxicated when he drove his
car into the car of Jeannie Coronado, who was seven and one-half
months pregnant.74 After observing fetal distress, the doctors per-

formed an emergency caesarian section and a live baby girl named

Krystal Zuniga was born.75 However, Krystal's condition soon deteriorated and she died approximately forty-three hours later as a result

of an injury to the brain suffered during the automobile collision.7 6
The court of appeals affirmed Cuellar's involuntary manslaughter conviction because when the victim is born alive and lives for a period of

time before dying from prenatal injuries, the widely used "born
alive"7 7 doctrine does allow a criminal conviction.
Before September 1, 2003, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas
courts of appeals have consistently denied civil recovery as well as the

imposition of criminal penalties for prenatal injuries if the child was
not subsequently born alive.7 9 In civil cases, the Texas Supreme Court
reasoned that if the Texas Legislature intended to allow recovery, they
71. Id.
72. See Cuellar v. State, 957 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997,
pet. ref'd).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 136.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The common law born alive doctrine provides that:
If a woman be quick with childe [sic], and by a potion or otherwise killeth it
in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe [sic] dyeth in her
body, and she is delivered of a dead child, this is a great misprision, and no
murder; but if the child be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or
other cause, this is murder; for in the law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive.
Id. at 137-38 (citing COKE, Institutes 58 (1648)).
78. Id. at 138.
79. See, e.g., Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distribs. Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex.
1987) (holding that the legislature did not intend the words "individual" or "person"
to be construed to include an unborn fetus in the wrongful death statute); Yandell v.
Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971) (per curium) (holding that a cause of action
does exist for prenatal injuries sustained at any prenatal stage provided that the child
is born alive and survives); Cuellar,957 S.W.2d at 140 (holding that the criminal law
can afford protection to children who are born and alive for a period of time before
dying as a result of prenatal injuries); Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893, 897-98 (Tex.
App.-E1 Paso 1994, no pet.) (holding that by the definitions of "child," "person,"
and "individual," the Texas legislature has specifically limited the application of our
penal laws to conduct committed against a human being who has been born and is
alive).
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would have specifically stated so in the statute.80 In regard to criminal
penalties, the courts of appeals relied on the Texas Legislature's spe-

cific exclusion of fetuses as "individuals" by the previous definition of
"individual" as "a human being who has been born and is alive" in the
Texas Penal Code.81
B.

Existing Conflicts Between Mother and Fetus

When one attempts to protect either the rights of a mother or the
interests of a fetus, more often than not, the rights of one are pro-

tected at the expense of the other.8 2 This occurs due to the direct
connection that exists between a mother and the fetus inside of her.

Attempts to assert rights for either mother or fetus results in the control of one by the other. For example, a mother's attempts to assert
her rights may directly conflict with or harm the fetus but the mother's
rights nonetheless control the fetus.83 On the other hand, if another
party can assert interests on behalf of the fetus, the mother loses control over her bodily autonomy. 84
80. See, e.g., Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 504 (finding nothing in the legislative history to
demonstrate an intent that an unborn fetus be embraced within the scope of the
statute).
81. Act of June 19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
3586, 3589 (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (Vernon Supp.
2004-2005)).
82. See Wendy Chavkin, Women and Fetus: The Social Construction of Conflict, in
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF A WOMAN'S BODY 193, 194-95 (Clarice Feinman ed.,
1992) (detailing the forces that have led to recent maternal-fetal antagonism); VALERIE GREEN, DOPED UP, KNOCKED UP, AND.. .LOCKEDUP?: THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF WOMEN WHO USE DRUGS DURING PREGNANCY 22-23 (Stuart Bruchey

ed., 1993) (explaining how "[v]iewing women and fetuses as separate entities with
distinct interests ... forces fetuses to compete against their mothers for protection

under the law");

SUE MAHAN,

CRACK COCAINE, CRIME, AND WOMEN: LEGAL, SO-

38-39 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1996) (analyzing judicial
alternatives to criminally prosecuting mothers who give birth to drug-dependent
babies).
83. See ROBERT H. BLANK, FETAL PROTECTION IN THE WORKPLACE: WOMEN'S
RIGHTS, BUSINESS INTERESTS, AND THE UNBORN 13 (1993) (recognizing that the primary responsibility during pregnancy remains the woman's); J. Ralph Lindgren, Legal
Responsibility for PrenatalSubstance Abuse, in PUNISHMENT: SOCIAL CONTROL AND
COERCION 115, 115 (Christine T. Sistare ed., 1996) (describing some harmful conduct
engaged in by pregnant women).
84. See GREEN, supra note 82, at 10 (noting that "any practice which places a fetus
ahead of its mother threatens a woman's constitutionally protected rights to. privacy
and bodily integrity"); Lisa Maher, Punishment and Welfare: Crack Cocaine and the
Regulation of Mothering, in THE CRIMINALIZATION OF A WOMAN'S BODY 157,
170-71 (Clarice Feinman ed., 1992) (discussing the view of fetal rights advocates that
once a woman has decided not to abort, she has a duty to give birth to a healthy
baby); Rosemarie Tong, Maternal-Fetal Conflict: The Misguided Case for Punishing
Cocaine-Using Pregnant and/or Postpartum Women, in PUNISHMENT: SOCIAL CONTROL AND COERCION 151, 165 (Christine T. Sistare ed., 1996) (explaining that punishing cocaine-using women for use during pregnancy makes a pregnant woman a "mere
fetal vessel'" and deprives her of any right to self-determination).
CIAL, AND TREATMENT ISSUES
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Slavery and Maternal-Fetal Conflict

The first notable conflict of rights between mother and child may
have taken place in slavery practices employed in the South.8 5 Slaveholders sought to maximize profits by demanding maximum labor
from pregnant slaves while also seeking to protect the long-term investment in the birth of a healthy slave child.86 For example, when a
slaveholder determined that a woman should be beaten, he sought to
protect the fetus. 87 The slaveholder would dig a hole in the ground
large enough for the woman's stomach. 88 He would then force her to
lie face down with her stomach in the hole while she was beaten on
her back. 89 This practice allowed the woman to be whipped while her
unborn child was protected. 90
Even after birth, the conflict between mother and child continued
to exist.9 1 Once the woman gave birth, especially if it was during harvest time, she was expected to return to work in the fields soon after
delivery. 92 Furthermore, the birth of children kept mothers attached
to the plantation. 93 Slaveholders threatened disobedient women with
the sale of their children in order to make them behave.94 Also, slaveholders held children as "hostages" in order to keep women from escaping, because many women were unwilling to run away without
their children.9 5
Slavery practices created a conflict between a "slave woman" and
her child immediately upon conception. 96 Slaveholders benefited economically from this conflict as the very act of a slave woman giving
birth profited the system that kept her in bondage.9 7 Even though
slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment9 8 and this conflict between the slave woman and her unborn child was removed,
other conflicts between a woman and her unborn child would continue to plague American women. 99
85. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 39 (1997).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 40.
at 39-40.
at
at
at
at

40.
43.
42.
43.

at 39.
at 41.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.

See Joan C. Callahan & James W. Knight, PrenatalHarm as Child Abuse?, in

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF A WOMAN'S BODY 127, 141 (Clarice Feinman ed., 1992)

("requiring women to submit to [medical] interventions for the good of their fetuses"); Chavkin, supra note 82, at 195 (excluding fertile women from worksites
deemed "fetoxic"); GREEN, supra note 82, at 20 (noting that abortion sets the inter-

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol11/iss1/9
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V11.I1.7

12

INNER TURMOIL
2004]Haynes: Inner Turmoil: Redefining
the Individual and the Conflict of Righ

2. Maternal-Fetal Conflict in Drug Addiction
Conflicts between woman and fetus continue to exist as a number of
states have begun to prosecute women for criminal offenses after giving birth to babies who test positive for drugs. 10 This trend toward
prosecution of drug-addicted mothers seems to fall under a rationale

of the state's interest in protecting the fetus from harm.'
While no one denies the harmful effects illegal drugs may have on a
fetus, 1°2 there are many "legal" behaviors that may cause damage to
developing fetuses. 10

3

A survey of 4 million pregnant women by the

National Institute on Drug Abuse ("NIDA") in 1992-93 found that
during their pregnancies 757,000 women drank alcoholic products;
820,000 women smoked cigarettes; and 221,000 women used illegal

drugs. 0 4 Fetal alcohol syndrome can cause mental and growth retar-

dation, "portwine stain" birthmarks, and facial deformities to a fetus.1

5

Smoking during pregnancy, on the other hand, besides causing

prenatal morbidity and mortality, also reduces infant birth-weights,
and increases the incidents of respiratory illnesses and Sudden Infant
Death Syndrome in infants. 10 6 Even the excessive use of caffeine can
increase the rates of miscarriage, premature delivery, and stillbirth. 01 7

Furthermore, poor nutrition and the lack of prenatal care can cause
ests of the fetus and the interests of the woman in direct opposition); MAHAN, supra
note 82, at 41 (listing acts or conditions on the part of a pregnant woman that could
pose some threat to her fetus); Tong, supra note 84, at 154-55 (discussing intentional
lifestyle behaviors engaged in by pregnant women that results in serious, largely irreparable damage to their infants).
100. "Between 1985 and 1995, at least two hundred women in thirty states were
charged with maternal drug use." ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 153.
101. Id.; see also LAURA E. GOMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS,
PROSECUTORS, AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 100 (D. Kelly
Weisberg ed., 1997) (noting that prenatal drug exposure "presents a story with a visible, easy-to-blame perpetrator, a completely innocent victim, and the possibility of
both redemption (for the drug-using mother) and retribution (on behalf of the lawabiding community)").
102. See Sue Page, Preventable Causes of Congenital Abnormalities, Women's
Health Au, at http://www.medicineau.net.au/clinical/womenshealth/PrevCongAbn.
html (last modified May 18, 1999) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
103. See Drew Humphries et al., Mothers and Children, Drugsand Crack: Reactions
to Maternal Drug Dependency, in THE CRIMINALIZATION OF A WOMAN'S BODY 203,
210-11 (Clarice Feinman ed., 1992); Callahan & Knight, supra note 99, at 146-47
(listing causes of low birthweight); MAHAN, supra note 82, at 35 (noting the high risk
of fetal alcohol syndrome occurring in newborn infants).
104. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Pregnancyand Drug Use Trends, (last modified June 25, 2003), at http://www.nida.nih.gov/Infofax/pregnancytrends.html (on file
with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
105. See Page, supra note 102, at http://www.medicineau.net.au/clinical/womenshealth/PrevCongAbn.html.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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just as much damage to the fetus because both are associated with low
birth-weights." 8
In order to protect the unborn child, the most common penalty for
drug use while pregnant is the immediate removal of the baby at birth
pending an investigation into parental fitness. 10 9 However, some
courts have expressed concern for the constitutional rights of pregnant
women and the state's possible encroachment upon those rights.1 10 In
In re Sharon Fletcher,"' the court refused to reach the conclusion that
drug use during pregnancy, resulting in a positive toxicology for cocaine, was indicative of repeated drug use after the birth of a child."'
In rejecting the petitioner's claim for prenatal child neglect, the court
stated, "I see no authority for the State to regulate women's bodies
merely because they are pregnant. By becoming pregnant, women 1do
13
not waive the constitutional protections afforded to other citizens.
The court further remarked that if the petitioner's argument was logically extended then "the State would be able to supersede a mother's
custody right to her child if she smoked cigarettes during her pregnancy, or ate junk food, or did too much physical labor or did not
exercise enough.""' 4
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of prosecution for maternal drug use in Ferguson v. City of Charleston."5 Ten women received obstetrical care at Medical University of South Carolina
16
("MUSC") and were arrested after testing positive for cocaine.'
Staff members at MUSC became concerned with an apparent increase
in the use of cocaine by patients who were receiving prenatal treatment." 7 As a result of the increased use of cocaine, MUSC developed
a policy that provided for the identification and testing of pregnant
patients suspected of drug use." 8 Further, through collaboration with
law enforcement officials, the MUSC policy provided procedures and
criteria for the arrest of pregnant patients upon positive drug test results.1 19 The Court looked at the "special needs" that supported the
program and determined that the testing violated the Fourth Amendment and that, although MUSC claimed the ultimate goal of the pro108. See Callahan & Knight, supra note 99, at 146; see also ROBERTS, supra note 87,
at 158.
109. ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 161; see, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT LAW § 1027
(Consol. 1999 & Supp. 2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 2002); cf
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) (West Supp. 2004).
110. See, e.g., In re Sharon Fletcher, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988).
111. See id.
112. Id. at 244.
113. Id. at 243.
114. Id.
115. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
116. Id. at 73.
117. Id. at 70.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 72-73.
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gram was to get women into substance abuse treatment and off of

drugs,1 2 ° "the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evi1
dence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal.'' 2

Thus, the Court's decision seems to recognize the need to protect the
mother's privacy interest from threat of criminal punishment.
While no one would deny the terrible effects that drug abuse can
have on a fetus, criminalizing the mother's conduct creates a conflict
that may lead to more harm than good. Pregnancy often motivates
women to make lifestyle changes and seek treatment for drug addiction.1 22 However, when threatened with prosecution,
women may
23
avoid prenatal care and drug treatment altogether.1
Maternal-fetal conflicts first existed in slavery practices and continue to exist in drug addiction cases today. While these conflicts may
arise when one attempts to protect the fetus, the attempt elevates the
safety of the fetus above that of the mother and the resulting conflict
between the two ultimately damages the humanity of the mother.

III.

PASSAGE OF THE PRENATAL PROTECTION

AcT

The Prenatal Protection Act was created and passed with ease by
the 78th Legislature in its regular session.' 24 It went into effect on
September 1, 2003.125 The bill, which was described as "a modest extension of Texas law, '' 12 6 provides civil and criminal penalties to third
parties that injure a fetus. 1 27 Senator Kenneth Armbrister, who introduced the bill as Senate Bill 319 in the Senate State Affairs Committee, explained that the bill was designed to protect an unborn child

from third-party harm against the wishes of the mother, namely in
cases of violent
crime, intoxication manslaughter, and physician
28
negligence.'
120. MUSC dropped its program in October 1994 under threat of losing federal
funding, yet it continued to praise its program's success at getting women off drugs.
However, it has failed to consider the possibility that the decrease in positive test
results may have been caused by women seeking treatment elsewhere out of fear of
arrest. See ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 168-69.
121. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83.
122. See id. at 84 n.23; ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 193.
123. See Ferguson, 523 U.S. at 84 n.23; BLANK, supra note 83, at 14; ROBERTS,
supra note 85, at 193.
124. Senate Bill 319 passed the Senate on May 22, 2003, by a viva voce vote. S.J. OF
TEX., 78th Leg., R.S. 2095 (2003). Senate Bill 319 passed the House by the vote of
112 yeas, 15 nays, and 2 present, not voting. H.J. OF TEX., 78th Leg., R.S. 4593 (2003).
125. Prenatal Protection Act, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 822, § 1.01, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws
2607.
126. Associated Press, GP Legislator Says His Bill Aims To Protect Fetuses (Dec.
11, 2002), available at http://www.dallasnews.com/s/dallas/tsw/stories/121102dntexxgr.
6e592.html (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
127. See Prenatal Protection Act, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 822, § 1.01, 2003 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2607.
128. See The Prenatal Protection Act: Hearings on S.B. 319 Before the Senate State
Affairs Comm., 78th Leg., R.S. (Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of Senator Armbrister),
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In the civil context, the Prenatal Protection Act amends the wrongful death statutes to modify the definition of an "individual" to include "an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization
until birth."12' 9 This amendment allows parents of an unborn child
that dies before being born alive to recover damages under Texas's
wrongful death statutes for the negligent or intentional acts of a third
party.
In the criminal statutes, an "individual" is now defined as "a human
being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth" and "death" now includes "for an
unborn child, the failure to be born alive."' 3 ° While these changes
apply to Texas Penal Code provisions regarding criminal homicide, assaultive offenses, intoxication manslaughter, and intoxication assault,
they are not applicable to certain conduct against an unborn child if
the conduct charged is:
(1) conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child; (2) a lawful medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed
health care provider with the requisite consent, if the death of the
unborn child was the intended result of the procedure; (3) a lawful
medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed
health care provider with the requisite consent as part of an assisted
reproduction as defined by Section 160.102, Family Code; or (4) the
dispensation of a drug in accordance with law
or administration of a
13 1
drug prescribed in accordance with the law.
Also, in order to prove pregnancy, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was amended by Article 38.40 which provides that "in a prosecution for the death of or injury to an individual who is an unborn
child, the prosecution shall provide medical or other evidence that the
mother of
the individual was pregnant at the time of the alleged
1 32
offense.'

A.

Senate Bill 319

Several people representing several different organizations voiced
their support for the adoption of Senate Bill 319. Joseph Pojman, Executive Director of the Texas Alliance for Life, spoke in favor of protecting innocent human life in the womb. 133
MerryLynn
Gerstenschlager, representing Texas Eagle Forum, listed the benefits
available at http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/Senate/VidArchives/03.htm (last visited
on Oct. 11, 2004).
129. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
130. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(26) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
131. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005); see also TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.102 (Vernon 2002).
132. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.40

(Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).

133. The PrenatalProtectionAct: Hearings on S.B. 319 Before the Senate State Affairs Comm., supra note 128, at (Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of Joseph Pojman of Texas
Alliance for Life).
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of the bill as protecting the individual, strengthening the family, reinforcing parental rights and responsibilities, supporting traditional
Judeo-Christian morals and principles, and providing equal protection
to all Americans.1 14 She also noted that twenty-seven states currently
treat the killing of an unborn child against the mother's wishes as a
form of homicide. 135 Bill Lewis, representing Mothers Against Drunk
Drivers ("MADD"), testified that MADD supported the bill by recognizing that it provided an additional incentive not to drink and
in support of the bill condrive. 136 Several other supporters testified
137
cerning the civil remedies portion.
Opponents of the bill feared that it was "a tool of anti-choice orga'
While those that testified
nizations to later reverse Roe v. Wade."138
against the bill supported the right of a woman to carry her pregnancy
to term and to seek redress, their primary concern was with labeling
the fetus an "individual" and the creation of another class of persons. 139 Instead, they proposed a substitute bill, which was introduced
by Senator Rodney Ellis;1 40 rather than, redefining the "individual,"
the committee substitute provided for increased penalties against injury to a pregnant woman. 14' However, the Ellis substitute was not
adopted and was therefore withdrawn.' 42 Senate Bill 319 passed committee on May 9, 2003,143 and ultimately passed in the Senate on May
22, 2003.144
B.

House Bill 246

The companion bill to Senate Bill 319 was introduced in the House
State Affairs Committee by Representative Ray Allen as House Bill
246.145 Testimony was taken on March 17, 2003 that yielded a result
134. See id. at (Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of MerryLynn Gerstenschlager of Texas
Eagle Forum).
135. See id.; see also Americans United for Life, States That Prohibit Crimes
Against the Unborn Child, at http://www.americansunitedforlife.org/guides/fhl/
fhstatutes.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law
Review).
136. The PrenatalProtection Act: Hearingson S.B. 319 Before the Senate State Affairs Comm., supra note 128, at (Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of Bill Lewis of MADD).
137. See id. at (Feb. 24, 2003) (statements of Dr. Mikeal Love, Mark Lanier, &
Norma Jean Salinas).
138. Id. at (Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of Kae McLaughlin of Texas Abortion and
Reproductive Rights Action League).
139. See id. at (Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of Kae McLaughlin of Texas Abortion and
Reproductive Rights Action League); see also id. at (Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of
Hannah Riddering of National Organization for Women).
140. See id. at (Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of Senator Ellis).
141. See id.
142. See id. at (May 8, 2003).
143. See id. at (May 9, 2003).
144. Senate Bill 319 passed the Senate by viva voce vote. S.J. OF TEX., 78th Leg.,
R.S. 2095 (2003).
145. Tex. H.B. 246, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
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very similar to the testimony in the Senate State Affairs Committee.14 6 Beverly Nichols, representing the Texas Family Physicians Resource Council, described House Bill 246 as a "Pro Human Rights
'
Bill." 147
As a physician, she testified that human life begins at fertilization and she also noted, "It takes a lot of force to cause a child to
'
die in the womb by trauma."148
Other testimony in support of the bill
compared pregnant animals to pregnant women and noted that
a rem1 49
edy already exists for harm inflicted upon pregnant animals.
Opponents to House Bill 246 expressed their fears that by establishing personhood for the fetus, the legislature was simply laying the
groundwork for an eventual reversal of Roe v. Wade. 150 They noted
that in terms of criminal penalties, loss of pregnancy is already accounted for in the punishment phase of a trial."' Furthermore, opponents urged the legislators to, at least, require viability before
enforcing criminal penalties instead of allowing punishment to begin
at fertilization, as pregnancy has been defined at the point of the implantation of a fertilized egg into the uterus. 152 Also in opposition,
Representative Farrar offered an amendment to House Bill 246 that
would provide for a third degree felony when a person "intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the
person's spouse, who is a pregnant woman."'1 53 The amendment further provided for enhanced penalties, more stringent than those offered by House Bill 246,154 when bodily injury to a pregnant woman
resulted in a miscarriage or stillbirth. 155 Representative Farrar noted
that without amendment, House Bill 246 adopts a "religious position°
as the law for the rest of the state," and is essentially part of an organized nationwide effort to lay the foundation for overturning Roe v.
Wade.'5 6 Despite the concerns of these opponents, Representative
146. Compare The PrenatalProtection Act: Hearings on H.B. 246 Before the House
State Affairs Comm., 78th Leg., R.S. (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://
www.house.state.tx.us/committees/broadcasts.php?session=78&cmte=450 (last visited
Oct. 12, 2004), with The Prenatal Protection Act: Hearings on S.B. 319 Before the
Senate State Affairs Comm., supra note 128, at (Feb. 24, 2003).
147. The Prenatal Protection Act: Hearings on H.B. 246 Before the House State
Affairs Comm., supra note 146, at (Mar. 17, 2003) (statement of Beverly Nichols of
the Texas Family Physicians Resource Council).
148. Id.
149. Id. at (Mar. 17, 2003) (statement of Teresa Collette).
150. See id. at (Mar. 17, 2003) (statement of Peggy Romberg of the Women's
Health and Family Planning Ass'n of Texas) (noting that the statute labels a fetus as a
"person" which the Supreme Court has refused to do in deciding Roe v. Wade).
151. See id.
152. See id. at (Mar. 17, 2003) (statements of Mike Hull & Kae McLaughlin of the
Texas Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League).
153. H.J. OF TEX., 78th Leg., R.S. 4589 (2003).
154. Representative Farrar's amendment would make an assault against a pregnant
woman a third degree felony, while in House Bill 246 the assault would remain a class
A misdemeanor. See id. at 4592.
155. Id. at 4590.
156. Id. at 4591.
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Farrar's amendment was not adopted, and House Bill 246 was reported favorably by the House State Affairs Committee on April 10,
2003.'57 Ultimately, the Prenatal Protection Act passed the House on
May 28, 2003,158 and was signed into law by Governor Rick Perry on
June 20, 2003.'
IV.

MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICTS CREATED BY THE PRENATAL

PROTECTION ACT

Despite good intentions, the Prenatal Protection Act creates new
conflicts between a woman and a fetus.16 ° By raising the status of a
fetus equal to that of a "human being who has been born and is
alive,"' 6 1 the personal rights of women are diminished. At the same
time, while a fetus is an "individual" in regard to the violent acts of
third parties, the mother is exempted from any violent conduct that
may cause death or injury to the fetus. Consequently, a fetus should
not be labeled an "individual" in the context of criminal penalties if it
will receive only some of the protection to which an "individual" is
entitled.
A.

Diminishing a Woman's Rights

The Prenatal Protection Act risks asserting the interests of the fetus
against the pregnant woman because it deems the fetus an "individual.' 61 While the fetus is not a body part, it exists inside of the woman and shares her body.' 6 3 Therefore, whatever happens to the
woman also happens to the fetus, although each may be affected in
different ways.' 64 To label the fetus an "individual," treats the pregnant woman as simply an incubator for potential life.' 65 While the
supporters of the law adamantly claimed its purpose is to protect a
woman's right to carry her pregnancy to term, 6 6 the wording of the
157. HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th Leg.,

R.S. (2003) (available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/hrofr.htm).
158. Senate Bill 319 passed the House by the following vote: Yeas 112, Nays 15, 2
present, not voting. H.J. OF TEX., 78th Leg., R.S. 4593 (2003).
159. See Prenatal Protection Act, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 822, § 1.01, 2003 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2609.
160. See discussion supra Part III.
161. Section 1.07 of the Texas Penal Code previously defined an "individual" as "a
human being who has been born and is alive." See Act of June 19, 1993, 73rd Leg.,
R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3589 (current version at TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 1.07 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05)).
162. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1315-16 (1991).
163. See id. at 1315.
164. Id. at 1314.
165. See id. at 1316; Humphries et al., supra note 103, at 210; see also Chavkin,
supra note 82, at 199.
166. HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th Leg.,

R.S. (2003) (available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/ hrofr.htm).
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law focuses on the harm to167the fetus as opposed to the harm that is
inflicted upon the woman.

Especially in cases resulting in the death of an unborn fetus, it cannot be denied that the primary pain from the loss of the unborn child

belongs to the mother. 161 Most scientists agree that a fetus cannot feel

pain until late in the pregnancy because the fetal brain is not sufficiently developed to feel pain until approximately the twenty-sixth
week. 1 69 Therefore, the law seeks to vindicate the mother's pain and

emotional suffering due to her loss. Furthermore, it is difficult to argue that death was against the interest of the fetus because it cannot
be certain when a fetus actually had an interest.170 Of course, if a
fetus were later born certain events would have been against those

interests in retrospect; however, if the fetus never exists outside the

womb, did that interest ever actually develop? 7 ' The present lan-

guage of the statute, 72 which supporters claim is simply for the right

of parents who wish to have a full-term successful pregnancy and a
happy birth,'7 3 fails to recognize the right as belonging to the woman

rather than the fetus.
The Prenatal Protection Act also diminishes the woman's right to

keep her pregnancy private. In order to prosecute for death or injury
to a fetus, the prosecution is required to provide evidence that the
woman was pregnant at the time of the offense. 1 74 Suppose the woman was not otherwise physically harmed by the offense and does not
want her pregnancy to be publicly revealed. By labeling the fetus as
an "individual," the prosecutor has a duty in the interest of justice to

protect the rights of the fetus against the privacy rights of the woman

and prosecute the third party for the offense. 1 75 Therefore, the prose167. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(26) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (redefining
an "individual" as "a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at every
stage of gestation from fertilization until birth").
168. See MacKinnon, supra note 162, at 1316 (explaining that the fetus "'is' the
pregnant woman in the sense that it is in her and of her and is hers more than anyone's"); see also BLANK, supra note 83, at 10 ("It is not the fetus that has rights; rather
it is the child once born that must be protected from avertable harm during
gestation.").
169. Dworkin, supra note 20, at 403.
170. Id.; Callahan & Knight, supra note 99, at 136-37 (discussing "potential persons" and "future persons").
171. See Callahan & Knight, supra note 99, at 136-37; Dworkin, supra note 20, at
403.
172. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(26) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (defining "individual" as "a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of
gestation from fertilization until birth").
173. See The Prenatal ProtectionAct: Hearings on Tex. S.B. 319 Before the Senate
Comm. on State Affairs, supra note 128, at (Feb. 24, 2003).
174. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.40 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
175. The primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys is to see that justice is done.
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 2.01 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2004-2005).
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cutor must ignore the woman's privacy interest and reveal her medical
information in a court of law.
Furthermore, the Prenatal Protection Act stands to harm the relationship between pregnant women and their doctors. Some prosecutors are interpreting the law to allow them to prosecute pregnant
women who use illegal substances for Delivery of a Controlled Substance to a Child. 1 76 These prosecutors require physicians to report
illegal drug use during pregnancy to the local police or to the Department of Protective and Regulatory Services. 1 77 Besides harming the
confidential relationship between physician and17patient,
this may also
8
discourage women from seeking prenatal care.
In some instances a woman's life and the life of a fetus may stand in
direct conflict with one another. For example, if a woman is in a coma
and unable to give her consent to medical procedures a doctor could
be forced to weigh the interests of the woman against those of the
fetus and ultimately forego medical treatment that could be beneficial
to the woman, but might prove harmful to the fetus. While the likelihood of prosecution for such actions may be slim, a doctor should not
be forced to take the risk. Would a guardian ad litem need to be appointed in order to protect the rights of the unborn? If so, the guardian ad litem must argue for the best interests of the child, meaning he
could not agree to allow harm to be inflicted upon the fetus.
B.

The Fetus as "Almost" an "Individual"

By defining the fetus as an "individual" in terms of third-party harm
while providing exceptions for the conduct of the mother, a fetus is
not an "individual" in the true sense of the word. If the fetus were
truly equal to a living human being, then intoxication manslaughter
and assaultive offenses that the mother commits would not be excused
because they are still direct criminal acts inflicted upon the fetus.
An exception for abortion must be included in the statute; however,
because Roe v. Wade has already established that a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion and a fetus is not a person under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 179 As a result of the Constitutional determination that a fetus is not considered a person, states cannot declare
that fetuses have rights competitive with the constitutional rights of
pregnant women. 8 ° In fact, in regard to the Texas anti-abortion law
176. Tanya Albert, Texas Fetus Abuse Law Could Spell Legal Trouble for Doctors,
(Feb. 2, 2004), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2004/02/02/gvsb0202.htm. A person commits a second degree felony if the person
knowingly delivers a controlled substance to a child. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 481.122(a)(1) (Vernon 2003).
177. Albert, supra note 176, at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/02/02/
gvsb02O2.htm.
178. Id.
179. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
180. Dworkin, supra note 20, at 401.
AMEDNEWS.COM,
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at issue in Roe the Court stated: "In view of all this, we do not agree
that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of
the pregnant woman that are at stake." 181 In other words, if there
were no exception for abortion provided in the statute, the law could
not be upheld without essentially overruling Roe v. Wade.
If the statute truly seeks to protect unborn children from violent
crimes and drunk drivers,182 there is no reason to include an exception
for any other conduct committed by the mother that results in injury
or death, besides abortion. If a fetus is protected from third party
violence, why should the mother's violence be condoned?183 The Prenatal Protection Act seeks to give the fetus standing equal to that of
"a human being that is born and is alive" according to the provisions
of the Texas Penal Code. 84 A mother would be charged with intoxication manslaughter if she had an automobile accident while intoxicated that resulted in the death of her infant child.185 Because the
fetus is supposed to be afforded the same rights as the infant, at least
in the criminal context, the mother should not face penalty in one case
but not the other. Justice is supposed to be blind. If the mother is
allowed to inflict a criminal act upon her fetus without fear of punishment then justice does not truly" exist for the harmed fetus.
If lawmakers choose to label the fetus an "individual," yet still allow
exceptions for the conduct of the mother then they are essentially
treating the fetus as a parasite that is merely invading the body of the
woman. The woman's conduct can then be viewed as a right to defend
herself against the appropriation and use of her body by a fetus. 8 6 By

excusing this conduct, Texas is essentially recognizing a woman's right
to protect herself from this fetus by any means necessary. If the Legislature truly intended for a fetus to be afforded the same rights as a
newborn infant, then it is doubtful it would support the reasoning that
a fetus is actually a parasite from which a woman may protect herself.
V.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Twenty-seven states have statutes that treat the killing of an unborn
child as a form of homicide. 87 Twelve states and the federal govern181. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
182. See HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th
Leg., R.S. (2003) (available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/hrofr.htm).
183. See Ashley Cook, Judge Won't Lower Slaying Suspect's Bail, THE LUFKIN
DAILY NEWS, July 3, 2004 (reporting 18-year-old man was charged with two counts of
murder for conspiring with his girlfriend to abort the couple's two unborn boys by
stepping on her stomach while girlfriend could not be charged), available at http://

www.lufkindailynews.com/hp/content/auto/feed/news/2004/07/02/1088827095.18121.08
17.0540.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).

184. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(26) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
185. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08 (Vernon 2003).
186. See Robin West, Liberalism and Abortion, 87 GEO.L.J. 2117, 2118 (1999).
187. Americans United for Life, supra note 135, at http://www.americansunited
forlife.org/guides/fh/fhstatutes.htm; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(A)
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ment treat the killing of an unborn child as homicide regardless of the
stage of the pregnancy, each with different variations.1 8 8 For example,
South Dakota requires that "a person knew, or reasonably should
189
have known, that a woman bearing an unborn child was pregnant.
Illinois also requires the person knew that the woman was pregnant
and its statutory language does not provide an exception for the
mother's conduct besides permitting abortion? 9° On the other hand,
states such as Utah, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Missouri do not require that
the actor have knowledge of the woman's pregnancy and provide no
exception for the mother's conduct except in the case of abortion. 9 '
The other fifteen states treat the killing of an unborn child as homicide depending on the different stages of embryonic development. 9 2
A.

Enhancement Statute for Injury to a Pregnant Woman

In order to correct the conflicts between mother and fetus, the Prenatal Protection Act should be repealed.193 It should be replaced by a
statute that enhances the criminal penalties in homicide, assaultive offenses, intoxication manslaughter, and intoxication assault when a
pregnant woman is involved. 94 By creating an enhancement statute
the Texas Legislature's goal of protecting a woman's right to carry her
pregnancy to term would still be achieved. 195 First, the enhancement
would acknowledge the injury to the pregnant woman and the loss
(Michie Supp. 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 782.09 (West 2000); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2 (West 2002); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/9-2.1 (West 2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3.2 (West 2002); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01 to 2903.06 (Anderson 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-17-6 (Michie 1998) UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 765-201 to 76-5-207 (2003 & Supp 2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West Supp. 2003).
188. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2 (West 2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/9-3.2 (West 2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2903.01 to 2903.06 (Anderson 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-17-6 (Michie
1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-201 to 76-5-207 (2003 & Supp. 2004); WIs. STAT.
§ 940.04 (West Supp. 2003). Further, Congrss signed the "Unborn Victims of
Violence Act" also known as "Laci and Conner's Law," into law on April 1, 2004.
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Signs Unborn Victims of
Violence Act of 2004 (April 1, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/04/print/20040401-3.html (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review);
see also Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, H.R. 1997, 108th Cong. (2d Sess.
2004).
ANN.

189. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-17-6 (Michie 1998).
190. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2 (West 2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/9-2.1 (West 2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3.2 (West 2002).
191. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2903.01 to 2903.06 (Anderson 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-201 to 76-5-207
(2003 & Supp. 2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West Supp. 2003).
192. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(A) (Michie Supp. 2003); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 187(a) (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2000).
193. See supra Part IV.A-B.
194. See supra Part IV.A-B.
195. See supra Part IV.A.
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that she suffers. 1 9 6 At the same time, the enhancement would increase the criminal penalty for this loss of potential life. No longer
would a killed or injured pregnant woman be recognized as just a woman. She would be recognized as a pregnant woman. Next, the enhancement statute would still protect the mother's conduct in cases of
abortion and would protect the doctor's conduct by allowing him to
provide treatment in the pregnant woman's best interest without fear
of prosecution for harm caused indirectly to the fetus. Finally, an enhancement statute would remove the direct conflicts between maternal and fetal rights. As opposed to treating the pregnant woman and
the fetus as two separate persons, the pregnant woman would still be
recognized as a pregnant woman and an offender would still be punished for inflicting harm upon her unborn child.
B.

Amending the Statute to Protect the "Individual"

On the other hand, if the statute is not repealed and an enhancement created, then it should at least be amended to protect the "individual."'1 97 While the statute must retain the exception for abortion
due to the Supreme Court's prior holdings that have labeled abortion
as a woman's fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment,
there should be no exception for other harmful conduct to the fetus
that is committed by the mother if it is not a licensed medical procedure.' 9 8 In this way the statute would hold the mother just as accountable as a third party for inflicting injuries to a fetus, especially in the
case of intoxication manslaughter. 19 9 If the fetus is truly to be considered an "individual," then any direct actions taken by the mother for
the purpose of harming the fetus, except for abortion, should not be
permitted. 2°
While Texas seeks to punish third parties for offenses against a
pregnant woman that cause her unborn fetus harm or death, the statute that it developed diminishes the rights of the pregnant woman and
creates a direct conflict with the fetus. 20 1 In order to remove this conflict, the Prenatal Protection Act should either be repealed or
amended. 2 2 Texas can either directly protect the existing rights of a
pregnant woman through an enhancement statute or can create new
rights for the fetus without providing exceptions for the mother, but as
the law stands now, it harms both parties by putting the rights of each
in direct conflict with each other.20 3
196. See supra Part IV.A.
197. See supra Part IV.B.
198. See supra Part IV.B

199. See supra Part IV.B.
200. See supra Part IV.B.
201. See supra Part IV.A.

202. See supra Part IV.A-B.
203. See supra Part IV.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

No one would deny that a woman has a right to carry her pregnancy
to full term. Nor would anyone deny that the State has an interest in
protecting human life. However, when the State attempts to achieve
that goal by pitting the rights of the pregnant woman against the rights
of the unborn fetus, the result can be harmful to both woman and
fetus. The Prenatal Protection Act seeks to protect the pregnant woman and the unborn fetus, but its enforcement, at times, will succeed
in harming both. Labeling the fetus as an "individual" elevates it to
the same status as the pregnant woman. Yet, there will be occasions
when the rights of the pregnant woman and the rights of the fetus
conflict with each other and the rights of one prevail over the rights of
the other. In instances where the pregnant woman is harmed by the
actions of a third party, but does not want her pregnancy revealed, she
loses. Alternatively, in instances where the pregnant woman's own
actions, which would be illegal if conducted by a third party, cause
harm to the fetus, then the fetus loses. If Texas's true goal is to protect a woman's right to carry her pregnancy to term and protect the
potential life of the unborn fetus, then the Prenatal Protection Act is
not the answer.
Michelle Haynes
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